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Abstract 
Surrounding Net Fi::;hery (laila) and Bottom Long Line Fishery which operate in the coastal waters 
of Kalpitiya Peninsula, compete for the same fish resources, resulting in a fishery dispute between 
the respective fishermen. Both fisheries target demersal as well as mid pelagic fishes, such as 
travellys (parava), mullets (galmalu) and barracudas (ulava). As the dispute had an adverse impact 
on the social harmony in the fishing community of the area, a socio-economic survey was 
conducted to study the underlying factors and to suggest policy measures to resolve the issue. 
The laila fishermen were resident fishermen in the Kalpitiya Peninsula while bottom long line 
fishermen were migratory fishermen from Negombo and Chilaw areas in the west coast of Sri 
Lanka. The Kalpitiya Peninsula is located in the North West coast, some 50 km away from the west 
coast. Although the educational level and literacy rate of the laila community was below that of the 
bottom long line community, the laila community was economically better off. The net economic 
returns from laila fishery were superior to that from bottom long line fishery. The boat owner's and 
crew's share per operation of laila fishery were Rs.3, 736 and Rs.94 7 respectively. The same figures 
for bottom long line fishery were Rs.588 and Rs.327 respectively. The resource rent from laila 
fishery was Rs.5,860, however, and much higher than that for bottom long line fishery (Rs.275), 
showing that the laila fishery exploits the targeted fish resource at a much higher rate compared to 
bottom long line fishery. This situation badly affects the equitable distribution ofresources between 
the two fishing communities and results in unequal economic gains. Based on the findings of this 
study, certain input/output controls are proposed to address this problem, among which is the need 
to increase license fee for laila fishery units to offset the higher exploitation rate of fish resources. 
Keywords: interactive fisheries, fishery dispute, laila fishery, Bottom Long Line fishery, 
resource rent 
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Introduction 
The development of marine capture fisheries and the increase in fisher population in Sri 
Lanka over the last fifty years has had a great impact on livelihood patterns of fishing 
communities of the island. The technical improvements have led to diversified fishing 
practices and a resultant increase in fishing pressure on the fish resources has resulted in 
frequent fishery disputes among fishermen. Such conflicts have been reported especially 
among those who target the same resource using different fishing techniques. Examples of 
such conflicts are the dispute between purse-seine and small-scale fishermen in the south 
western coast in the 1980's and that between ring-net and small-scale fishermen (Sanders 
et al., 1997). These disputes have had negative impacts on both the social and economic 
status of fishing communities and have led to the imposition of regulations, such as the 
purse-seine fishing regulations in 1986, by the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (Ariyadasa, 1998). Though regulations have been imposed, they were not 
based on thorough investigations of the resource base or of the impact of respective 
fisheries on the social and economic aspects of the fishing community. 
Several types of surrounding-net fisheries are practiced in the coastal waters of Sri Lanka. 
In the Kalpitiya Peninsula, a surrounding net, known as "/a;/a", is used from November to 
April. This fishery technique targets fish varieties such as travellys (parava), mullets 
(galmalu) and barracudas (ulava). The technique of laila fishery is said to have been 
introduced by migrant fishermen from Mannar, who are regarded as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) due to the ethnic conflict in the North-East of Sri Lanka. The fishermen in 
the islets of Baththalangunduwa and Palliyawatte off Kalpitiya - who are migrat01y 
fishermen from the Negombo and Chilaw areas have been engaged in fishing activity for 
the last 25 years - use bottom long line fishery for the same fish resources. The 
introduction of laila fishe1y to the Kalpitiya area occurred around 1998 and is a minor 
modification of laila valai nets used in the Mannar area. This technique results in higher 
catch rates and the fishe1y became a lucrative source oflivelihood forthe laila operators. 
With the increase in laila fishe1y, the catch and income of the bottom long line operators 
were badly affected and they organized to protest against laila fishe1y. As a measure to 
resolve this conflict and to control the fishing effort, the Ministry ofFisheries and Aquatic 
Resources introduced a licensing system to laila operators in the Kalpitiya Peninsula. The 
license fee was Rs.20,000 per annum per laila fishing unit and around 115 licenses have 
been issued. Despite these measures, however, frequent conflicts, often of a violent nature, 
continued to occur between the two parties. Although the re-licensing has been 
discontinued to control this situation, the laila operators continue to fish without proper 
perm1ss1on. 
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A study was conducted, therefore, with the objectives of examining the social, economic 
and marketing dimensions of the conflict, in order to provide the information needed as a 
policy guideline to the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. 
Materials and Methods 
A survey was conducted in 2005 on fishermen at the Kalpitiya and Baththalangunduwa 
fish landing centers. A total of twenty two laila operators and eighteen bottom long line 
operators were selected using a simple random sampling method. Data were collected by 
administering a questionnaire and were analysed using Statistical software (Minitab 
version 14). 
Model 
(l)OS= a(TR-VC) 
Where; OS= Owner's share 
TR= Total revenue 
VC =Variable costs 
a= Share basis 
(2) RR= Opp+ CSpp 
Where; RR =Resource rent of fishing operation 
Opp =Owner's pure profit 
CS pp =Crews pure profit 
Results and Discussion 
Characteristics of the fishing operations 
Laila Fishing Operation 
A laila fishing operation is a collective action of a number of fishermen and needs 
substantial human and physical resources compared to other coastal fishety methods. 
One fishing unit comprises 3 to 4 crafts powered by 25-30 hp out-board motors and 10 to 
15 personnel including skippers, fishing crew and divers needed for the operatioh. The 
length of a laila net is about 120-150 fathoms with a height of about 9-16 fathoms. In 
addition to possessing all the features of a typical purse-seine net, it also has hanging 
sand bags to submerge the net towards the seabed. 
The laila fishing operation is conducted during the daytime. The fishermen depart from 
the landing center early in the morning and arrive in the late evening. They use global 
positioning system (GPS) equipment to find suitable places to shootthe net, usually on or 
around rocky areas in the sea using previous data stored in their GPS. After reaching the 
suitable area for operation divers observe whether fish shoals are available on or around 
rocky places. If fish shoals are available, fishing crew start the shooting of the net 
according to signals given by divers. To prevent the escape of fish, boats are run fast 
around the net. If the shoal of fish is completely surrounded by the net, divers drag the 
bottom ropes of the net to make a purse to trap the fish. One of the criticisms raised by 
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fishermen opposed to this fishery was that at times laila fishermen use explosives such as 
dynamite during the operation. 
As the success of laila fishing is affected greatly by the conditions in the sea, the technique 
requires specialized skills and experience. Calm seas and clear water is essential in order 
to observe and locate fish schools, while wind speed and water currents tend to adversely 
affect the fishing operation. The period of the year when conditions are most suitable for 
laila fishing are, therefore, from November to April. 
Bottom Long Line (BLL) Fishing operation 
Bottom long line fishing operations in the area are similar to long line operations 
elsewhere except for the operating depth. Tuna long lines are used to catch mid-water and 
deepwater swimming tunas while bottom long lines are used to catch demersal fish close 
to the seabed. In the BLL fishery, 2- 3 fishermen are engaged in each fishing operation. A 
fishing unit comprises one 25-30 hp out-board motor craft and on an average, 20 long line 
baskets, each with five hooks. Spotted sardinella (hurulla) or squid (della) are used as the 
bait. The fishermen depart for fishing around 16:00 in the evening and arrive at 08.00 the 
following morning. Bottom long line operators shoot their lines at depths of around 15-20 
fathoms and catch travellys (parava), queen fishes, mullet (gal malu) and barracuda 
(ulava). 
Social attributes of the fishing communities 
Demograph icAspects 
The two communities in question basically differ by their location; the laila community 
resides in the Kalpitiya land stretch and bottom long line fishers reside atPalliyawatte and 
Baththalangunduwa islands located about 30 km north ofKalpitiya and about 8 km west 
ofKudiramale point. The laila fishermen are permanent residents in Kalpitiya and bottom 
long line operators are migratory fishermen from Negombo and Chilaw areas. Some of 
the demographic attributes of the two communities are given in Table 1. The BLL 
operators were all Sinhala Roman Catholics whereas the laila community comprises all 
three major Sri Lankan ethnic groups, namely, Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim. The respective 
communities show considerable disparity in educational levels; the majority in the laila · 
community had only studied upto primary school level but the majority of the bottom 
long line community had a secondary education. This situation was also reflected in the 
literacy rate of two communities. 
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Table t. Demographic attributes of laila bottom long line operators 
Demographic Laila Bottom long line 
attributes 
Ethnicity(%) Sinhala Tamil Muslim Sinhala 
61 26 13 100 
Mean age of 32 years 30 years 
fishermen 
82.6 72.2 
Civil status(%) Married Married 
82.6 72.2 
Education level(%) Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
62.2 34.8 27.8 72.2 
Literacy (%) 56.5 88.9 
Average family size 5.8 3.8 
Dependency ratio 4.9 2.8 
Children < 18 years 2.1 1. 1 
per household 
Children schooling 2.0 0.7 
per household 
The literacy rate of the BLL operators at about 88.9% was comparable to the national 
level figure of about 92%. The average family size oflaila operators was 5 .8 with most of 
them being extended families. In contrast, due to the migratory nature, many BLL 
operators had nuclear families. The dependency ratio of families of laila fishermen was 
higher than that ofBLL operators. Housing conditions of the two communities showed 
improved levels compared to national level figures. Sanita1y conditions such as drinking 
water, safe toilet facilities were available in both communities and many of them were 
better off than the national average levels (CBSL, 2005). Sixty seven per cent of Iaila 
families had telephone facilities, either mobile or fixed lines compared to the national 
level of 23.9%. With regard to the availability of motorized transport, BLL families 
showed a status similar to national level statistics while Iaila families showed greater 
ownership of motorized transport. 
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Table 2. Housing conditions and other amenities of laila and bottom long line operators 
Category 
Brick or cement block walls 
Tiled or asbestos roofing 
Cement tiled or better flooring 
Own well or pipe borne water 
Water sealed latrine 
Electricity 
TY 
Telephone (land/eel lular) 
Motorized transport 
Economic aspects 
Capital Investment 
Laila(%) 
91.3 
82.6 
95.6 
78.3 
82.6 
78.3 
82.6 
69.7 
34.8 
Bottom long National level 
line ('Yo) (1%) 
83.3 75.3 
88.9 78.8 
100 68.2 
77.8 62.2 
77.8 78.4 
94.4 73.9 
72.2 68.2 
22.2 23.9 
22.2 25.4 
The mean capital investment of the laila operators studied was Rs. 544,809 while that of 
a bottom long line operator was Rs. 284,650 (Table 3). The capital investment for an 
owner of a laila fishing unit was nearly twice than that of a bottom long line operator due 
to the higher cost of inputs. 
Table 3. Mean value of the fishing implements oflaila operators and bottom long line 
operators 
Asset/boat owner Laila (Rs.) Bottom long line (Rs.) 
Craft & engine 400,545 249,094 
Gear 143,864 35,556 
Total 544,809 284,650 
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An economic analysis of the respective fishing operations, shown in Table 4, is based on 
comparing economic indicators such as revenue, owner's share, crew share and resource 
rent of fishing. A laila fishing unit comprised four crafts with out-board motors (OBM), 
one laila net and l 0-15 crew members including the skipper and divers, while that of a 
bottom long line fishery unit comprised of one craft with OBM, 20 bundles of bottom 
long lines (100 hooks) and 2-3 crew members including the skipper. 
It can be seen that the economics of laila and BLL operations show a wide disparity; the 
income from a unit of laila is Rs. 44,805 whereas that from a BLL is Rs. 4, 171 An owner's 
share from a laila fishery was six times that ofa BLL unit. The share of a crew member of 
laila and BLL fishing unit was around Rs. 947 and Rs. 327 per operation, respectively. 
The number of days engaged in fishing operations, however, varied greatly between the 
two types of fisheries since, laila cannot operate in rough, windy sea conditions and when 
the water is not clear. As a result, the number of days oflaila operations was half of that of 
BLL fishery. Therefore, during the season from November to April, the income of an 
owner of a laila unit was Rs. 319,082 and for a BLL operator, Rs. 112,502. The respective 
seasonal income of crew members of laila and BLL were about Rs. 80,882 and 
Rs. 62,499. 
Table 4. Average estimates of the cost and revenue (in Rs.) of laila or BLL operation 
Economic indicator Laila (Rs.) Bottom long line (BLL) (Rs.) 
Revenue I day 44,805 4,171 
Operation expenditure I day 14,918 2,700 
Divisible income I day 29,887 1,471 
Ovvner' s share 14,944 588 
Mean boats I operation 4 1 
One boat owner's share 3,736 588 
Crew share 14,944 883 
Mean crew I operation 15.78 ') ~ .._. I 
Crew share I crew member 947 327 
No. of days per season 85.4 l 191.2 
One boat owner's share/ season 319,081 112,502 
Crew share I crew member/ season 80,882 62,499 
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Resource (economic) Rent 
The resource or economic rent, defined as the surplus value over and above the 
opportunity cost of all factors of production employed in a competitive fishery, arise 
from ownership or access to valuable resources in limited supply (Panayatou, 1985). 
This is calculated by adding the pure profits of the boat owner and the crew members. 
When estimating pure economic profit from the fishery resource, the opportunity costs 
are deducted from the income earned by the owner and the crew. For this study, the 
owner's and the crew's pure profit indicate return to capital and labour, respectively. The 
opportunity cost of capital indicates income forgone by craft owners who invest in 
fishing compared to other activities in the financial market. The opportunity cost of 
owner's labour is the income forgone by managing his craft and gear instead of working 
in another job (Vidanage et al., 2000). The opportunity cost of labour is based on the 
average daily income of a crew member in the small scale fishery sector (Wimalasena, 
2005). Accordingly, the resource rent of a laila fishing unit per operation was Rs. 5,860 
and the same in BLL fishing unit was Rs. 275 showing that a laila fishery earns an 
exorbitant resource rent compared to bottom long line fishery. As the resource rent of 
BLL was positive despite the magnitude of the difference, it indicates the economic 
viability of its existence. In terms of the equitable distribution of fish resources among 
the two kinds of fishermen, however, it \vas not satisfactory. The regulation of the laila 
fishing operations is needed, therefore, to prevent discrimh1ation against the bottom long 
line operators. On the other hand, however, laila fishery recorded a greater efficiency in 
contrast to its negative consequences on the equitable distribution of resources. 
Table 5. Resource rent of laila and bottom long line fishery per craft per operation 
Hem Laila (Rs.) Bottom long line 
(Rs.) 
Owners' share 3,736 588 
Owner's pure profit 3,272 202 
Crew share 3,788 883 
Crew's pure profit 2,588 73 
Resource rent 5,860 275 
Market Structure 
One of the criticisms against the laila fishery was the dominant role it played in the 
determination of fish prices in the Kalpitiya Peninsula. The bottom long line operators 
charge that the higher catch rates of laila operations tend to drastically reduce the price of 
fish. 
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Table 6. Mean fish prices (per kg) of laila and bottom long line fishery 
Price variation 
Variety Laila (Rs.) Bottom long line (Rs.) 
High Low High Low 
Travellys (parava) 121 79 114 74 
Mullets (meeweti) 101 68 108 65 
Barracuda (ulava) 11 1 79 112 69 
The above table which shows the major varieties and their price variation during the 
fishing season did not indicate a significant difference. It should be noted, however, that 
the market places and fish assemblers of the two fisheries were different from one 
another. Assemblers ·who bought fish from Baththalangunduwa supplied fish to the 
Colombo wholesale fish market and their buying price, therefore, depended on the daily 
fish price at the Colombo wholesale market. The assemblers from regional places such as 
Kurunegala and Anuradhapura come to Kalpitiya Lo purchase rish from laila operators. 
Due to the assured fish supply of laila fisheries, more regional fish traders participate in 
the Kalpitiya fish auctions. This situation promotes competitive fish marketing and 
provides oppo1tunity to other kinds of small scale fishermen to dispose their catch at 
competitive prices. In the off season of lailafishery, the intlux of fish traders from the 
interior places to Kalpitiya was minimal compared to the fishing season. 
Livelihood Opportunities 
As a productive process, fishing operations generate employment opportunities to people 
living in a particular area. As there is a fishery dispute between the two groups of 
fishermen, it is important to consider not only the economic benefit directly accrued to 
the society, but also the overall social benefits. The following table shows the livelihood 
opportunities provided by each type of fishery. 
Table 7. Livelihood opportunities of laila and bottom long line fisheries 
Manpower utilization Laila Bottom long line 
(number employed) 
Direct livelihood per operation 15.8 2.7 
Indirect livelihood per operation 6.4 2.0 
Total livelihood per operation 22.2 5.3 
Total population benefited 2712 742 
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Direct livelihood depicts the fishing crew including skippers/owners of crafts whereas 
the indirect beneficiaries include net menders, fish loaders and other labourers on the 
beach. 
Lega/Aspects 
When laila fishery was first introduced into the Kalpitiyaa Peninsula, it was not 
considered a threat by bottom long line operators. Following applications from laila 
operators, around 115 operating licenses were issued by the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources. These licenses were issued to laila operators under the purse seine 
fishing regulations. According to the purse seine fishing regulations imposed in 1987, 
purse seine is defined as "a ring of net built like a long shallow curtain, which is shot to 
surround a shoal offish in mid water both from the sides and from underneath, and then 
closed underneath with a purse ring" (Ariyadasa, 1998). Purse seine is allowed to 
operate up to 10 miles (16 km) from the shore in Puttalam district as the continental 
shelf is wider there compared to the Southern shores of Sri Lanka. But laila net is used 
to catch demersal fishes in the sea bed of shallow areas. Regulations must, therefore, 
take into account both the resource type and the location. The issue of permits should 
also be done after a comprehensive investigation of the resource base as well as the 
socio-economic consequences to other fisheries. 
Interactive Dynamics 
The interactions between laila and bottom long line fishermen covers economic, social, 
legal and marketing aspects (Fig. 1) with economic and social interactions playing a key 
role in the dispute. As the laila fishery provides more incentives to the operators and 
their living standards have been improved, they are unwilling to give up the technique. 
As permits had earlier been issued to them, they do not accept that it can now be made 
illegal. In addition, the other resident fishermen in Kalpitiya, do not protest against the 
laila fishery. Although bottom long line fishermen are not residents of the area, they 
have been engaged in this activity for more than 25 years, and believe that their right to 
the fish resources should not be compromised. With the increase in the number of craft 
and populations of migratory fishermen, similar conflict situations arise in many parts 
of Sri Lanka. Conflicts occur when users are no longer prepared to cooperate or abide 
by established rules of conduct with respect to the use of a particular resource 
(Oakerson, l 992). Therefore, three kinds of conflicts in the use and management of 
coastal resources could be identified; conflict between users of the same resource, 
between users of different resources, and conflicts between governmental agencies 
administering programs or projects related to the coast. Conflict over natural resources 
can occur at many levels and have class and political dimensions (Buckles and Rusnak, 
1999). In the present study, intense and often violent reactions were reported between 
bottom long line and laila operators and it appeared, as predicted by Buckles and 
Rusnak above, that certain politically powerful groups were behind the conflicts. The 
Police and Navy often had to be called in to release the craft under the custody ofBLL 
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MARKETING 
LEGAL 
Fig. l. Interactive forces of the fishery dispute 
Since the dispute affects the social harmony in the area, it is necessary in everyone's 
interests to find a longdlasting solution which takes into account the views of the 
respective fishermen. The fishermen expressed following views to us in relation to the 
problem. 
• Laila operators were willing to give up their fishing technique provided the 
government was prepared to replace the fishing gear enabling them to engage in 
an alternative fishing method. 
• Bottom long line operators had no objections to the former laila operators fishing 
in the same area. 
• Both parties respected the opinion of scientists at NARA about the resource 
potential of the targeted varieties and the impact of laila fishery on such 
resources and were prepared to abide by any modifications that could be made to 
fishing gear to minimize harmful effects. 
Ludicello et al., p999) have pointed out that the policy measures for conflict resolution, 
from an econorriic perspective, should be based on input and output controls, such as 
those listed below: 
Input controls 
• Restricting the number of fishermen working in a fishery 
• Restricting the volume of gear or the size of crafts 
• Limiting the period of time over which fishermen are allowed to catch fish, in 
order to spread reductions equally among them but not reduce the number of 
participants 
• Restricting the technology that fishermen are allowed to use 
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Output controls 
" Imposing landing quotas to limit the total quantity of fish that can be caught 
" Imposing catch limits per craft 
ID Imposing some restrictions on the type offish landed 
ID Imposing technical restrictions such as time periods and areas in which fish can 
be caught 
ID Imposing taxes or entry permits 
These input and output controls used should be based not only on socio-economic criteria 
but also the resource potential of the targeted fish varieties of the two fisheries. It should 
be remembered, however, that the use of input and output controls as a management tool 
in preventing conflicts is futile in the absence of effective and efficient monitoring and 
surveillance mechanisms. When employing input output controls for laila fishery, 
therefore, setting up of a monitoring and surveillance mechanism is essential for conflict-
free fishing operations. 
Conclusions 
Over the last 50 years, fishermen were encouraged to improve their fishing methods in 
order to increase the total fish production in Sri Lanka. In recent years, however, this has 
changed with current policy makers paying more attention to resource depletion and 
sustainability, since sustainable production considers not only efficiency but also inter-
community and inter-generational equity. Although laila fishery is clearly more efficient 
than BLL fishery, it is not acceptable with respect to equitable distribution resource 
among fishermen. While BLL fishery remains economically viable and laila fishery more 
profitable, the resource rent of laila fishery was 20 times that ofBLL fishery, showing that 
the laila fishery exploits the resource at a very high rate. If the laila fishery was allowed to 
continue, the fishing effort should be strictly restricted using input and output controls. 
Moreover, since the present license fee (Rs. 20,000) is not adequate with respect to its 
resource rent, it should be increased to offset the exploitation rate. 
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